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Clean Power and Chevron: Scoring the Fight for Obama’s Climate Change Rule 
Leo Capoferri1 
I. Introduction 
When the EPA proposed the Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) in June 2014, the response was 
mixed.  Proponents viewed it as a sensible and realistic means of reducing CO2 emissions 
produced by the energy sector.2   Many however, were skeptical.  Opponents of the rule argue 
that it relies on a rarely used section of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) to justify a radical expansion 
of EPA authority.3  Several states and industry participants have challenged both the proposed 
and final rule,4 and the Supreme Court recently took the unprecedented step of granting an 
immediate stay pending litigation.5 
The stakes are high for the EPA and the Obama administration.  Facing recalcitrant 
opposition from a Republican-controlled Congress, President Obama promised executive action 
on climate change,6 and directed the EPA to limit CO2 emissions from existing power plants.7  
Given the remaining uncertainties and ongoing denial of the scientific underpinnings of 
                                                 
1 J.D. Candidate, 2017 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2013 The College of New Jersey.  Special Thanks 
to Professor Jordan Paradise for her guidance in writing this Comment. 
2 See Thomas Carbonell & Megan Ceronsky, Section 111(d) and the Clean Power Plan: The Legal Foundation for 
Strong, Flexible, and Cost-Effective Carbon Pollution Standards for Existing Power Plants, 44 ENVTL. L. 
REP.11086, 11090-91 (2014). 
3 See Keith Goldberg, States, Industry Groups Launch Clean Power Plan Legal Fight, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2015, 2:13 
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/718094/states-coal-groups-launch-clean-power-plan-legal-fight (according to 
West Virginia’s Attorney General “[t]he Clean Power Plan is one of the most far-reaching energy regulations in this 
nation’s history.”).   
4 See In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Alan Neuhauser, Mess of Lawsuits Set to 
Challenge Clean Power Plan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, (Oct. 23, 2015, 11:20 AM) 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/23/mess-of-lawsuits-set-to-challenge-clean-power-plan. 
5 See West Virginia v. E.P.A., No. 15A773 (U.S. 2016) (order granting stay) available at 
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/02/09/document_pm_03.pdf.  
6 See John M. Broder & Richard W. Stevenson, Speech Gives Climate Goals Center Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/us/politics/climate-change-prominent-in-obamas-inaugural-
address.html?_r=0/ 
7 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015) 
(transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-
clean-power-plan). 
 2 
anthropogenic climate change, executive action has the potential to alter the debate on mitigation 
policies, forcing the opposition to challenge the extent of carbon reduction rather than the policy 
itself.8  In addition, successful carbon mitigation policies bolster the United States’ credibility on 
the international stage as it continues to assume a leadership role in transnational efforts to 
address global warming.9  Indeed, many speculated whether the Supreme Court’s decision to 
stay the rule would undermine the historic Paris Agreement on climate change.10  
The CPP aims to reduce CO2 emissions from existing power plants by 32 percent from 
their 2005 levels by 2030.11  To achieve this goal, the CPP sets state-specific emissions standards 
tailored to each state’s present energy mix.12  The EPA calculated these standards to reflect the 
reductions that are achievable through the implementation of three “building blocks,” each of 
which describes a particular method of reducing CO2 emissions that the EPA has deemed 
feasible and cost-effective.13  The building blocks provide for emissions reductions through 
increased efficiency, or heat rate improvements, (building block 1) and the substitution of 
cleaner sources—natural gas and renewables such as wind and solar—for coal (building blocks 2 
and 3).14  Each state is responsible for devising and implementing a plan for meeting the CPP’s 
                                                 
8 See Charlie Rose: President Obama’s Clean Power Plan with Gina McCarthy, Head of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (PBS television broadcast Aug. 2, 2015) available at  
http://www.charlierose.com/watch/60599780. 
9 See id. 
10 See Robinson Meyer, Did the Supreme Court Doom the Paris Climate Change Deal?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 12, 
2016),  http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/02/the-parts-of-obamas-climate-legacy-that-will-
survive/462294/. 
11 See EPA, Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan (2015) available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
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emissions standards, subject to EPA approval. 15  If states fail to submit a plan, the EPA is 
authorized to substitute its own, which the states are obligated to implement.16 
The CPP has broad implications for the energy sector.  Due to the nature of GHGs, 
meaningful emissions reductions cannot be achieved cost-effectively by measures implemented 
at each facility.17 The EPA attempts to solve this problem by identifying reductions that are 
achievable across the entire energy grid, and not merely as a result of improvements to individual 
power plants.  Consequently, building blocks 2 and 3 are emissions reduction measures that 
require actions “beyond the fenceline,” i.e. outside the physical boundaries of an affected power 
plant.  In order to meet emissions rates set by the CPP, owners and operators will be forced to 
reduce generation from coal-fired facilities and substitute generation from natural gas and 
renewable sources.18  The EPA estimates that the rule will reduce coal-fired generation by nearly 
50% from current levels.19 Consequently, the CPP will restructure the nation’s energy supply, 
blurring the line between pollution reduction and energy regulation.  
In addition to the CPP’s negative implications for the coal industry, the required 
emissions reductions are considerably more stringent for some states compared with others, 
depending on the extent of their reliance on coal-fired power. 20  For these reasons, the CPP has 
inspired vigorous opposition from states and industry. Currently, twenty-seven states and 
                                                 
15 See id.  
16 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2) (2012). 
17 See Ann E. Carlson & Megan M Herzog, Symposium: Text In Context: The Fate of Emergent Climate Regulation 
After UARG and EME Homer, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 22, 29 (2015). 
18 See Eric Anthony DeBellis, In Defense of the Clean Power Plan: Why Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under Clean 
Air Act Section 111(D) Need Not, and Should Not, Stop at the Fenceline, 42 ECOLOGY L. Q. 235, 254 (2015). 
19 See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule at 2-3, 3-24 (Aug. 2015), 
www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-final-rule-regulatory-impact-analysis.  
20 See generally EPA, Goal Computation Technical Support Document (2014), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602tsd-goal-computation.pdf.  
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“countless” industry participants are currently challenging the rule.21  Opponents of the CPP 
consistently rely on two arguments.22  First, they argue that a drafting error—caused when two 
separate versions of § 111(d), one drafted by the House and one drafted by the Senate, were 
included in the 1990 amendments to the CAA—should be resolved to preclude regulation of 
CO2 from existing power plants.23  Second, opponents argue that the EPA lacks the authority to 
regulate beyond the fenceline. 24   Because the EPA relies on § 111(d) as the source of its 
authority for the CPP, the first argument creates a threshold issue that a reviewing court will 
likely be forced to resolve.  The second argument is important because it encapsulates a powerful 
narrative that the EPA’s critics have employed, which describes the CPP as a sweeping and 
unprecedented expansion of the agency’s authority.25   Taken together, both arguments raise 
issues of first impression and will likely comprise the heart of the legal challenge to the CPP.  
                                                 
21 Robin Bravender, Ellen M. Gilmer & Jeremy P. Jacobs, Legal Challenges—Overview & Documents, E & E 
PUBLISHING http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last updated Feb. 19, 2016). 
22 In addition, some opponents have argued that the CPP violates the 10th amendment, a claim which has been 
described as “spurious.”  See Patrick Parenteau, The Clean Power Plan Will Survive Pt. 2, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2015, 
10:15 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/704048/the-clean-power-plan-will-survive-part-2.  Moreover, some 
opponents have focused on the EPA’s § 111(b) rule, which is a statutory predicate of the CPP.  See Patrick 
Parenteau, The Clean Power Plan Will Survive Pt. 1, LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2015, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/704046/the-clean-power-plan-will-survive-part-1.  This Comment ignores these 
arguments.  
23 See Coal Industry Application for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action Pending Judicial Review at 6,  Murray 
Energy Corp, v. E.P.A., No. 15A778 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Coal Industry Stay Application]; Application 
by 29 States and State Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action During Pendency of Petitions for 
Review at 7-8, No. 15A773 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016) [hereinafter States’ Stay Application]; Application of Utility and 
Allied Parties for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action Pending Appellate Review at 11, No. 15A776 (U.S. Jan. 
27, 2016) [hereinafter Utilities’ Stay Application]; Final Opening Brief of Petitioner at 15, In re Murray Energy 
Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151) [hereinafter Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief]; Eric 
Groten, Here Be Dragons: Legal Threats to EPA’s Proposed Existing Source Performance Standards for Electric 
Generating Units, 45 Envtl. L. Rep. 10116, 10120-21 (2015). 
24 See Application of Business Associations for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action Pending Appellate Review 
at 10-11, 16-17, West Virginia v. E.P.A., No. 15A773 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Business Associations’ Stay 
Application]; States’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 15-21; Utilities’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 11-12; 
Groten, supra note 23, at 10122.  
25 See, e.g., States’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 15.  
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Judicial review will hinge on the Court’s application of the Chevron doctrine,26 as both 
issues involve EPA’s interpretation of the CAA.  Under Chevron, a court must defer to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute if Congress’ intent is ambiguous. With regards to 
the drafting error, opponents of the CPP argue that the version of § 111 (d) drafted by the House 
should govern, and that it unambiguously precludes the regulation of CO2 from power plants,27 
whereas the EPA argues that the House version is ambiguous, but can be reasonably interpreted 
so as not to conflict with the Senate version, which does not prohibit the CPP.28  Consequently, a 
reviewing court will likely be forced to determine whether the House version is ambiguous under 
Chevron step one in order to resolve this issue.  The fenceline issue involves the EPA’s 
interpretation of the terms “best system of emission reduction” (“BSER”), which comprises the 
statutory basis for calculating the CPP’s emissions standards.29  Opponents challenge the EPA’s 
interpretation as being overly expansive, whereas the EPA argues that outside the fenceline 
measures are authorized under the plain meaning of the term “system,” as well as the legislative 
history and overall structure of the CAA.30  Resolving this issue will implicate Chevron to some 
degree.  Though the EPA argues that its interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the 
statute,31 the Court could very well invoke Chevron step two, as “system” is not defined within 
the CAA, and “best system of emission reduction” lacks a clear meaning.32  Alternatively, recent 
cases suggest the Court’s willingness to deny Chevron deference, under what is known as the 
                                                 
26 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
27 See, e.g., Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 23, at 15-16. 
28 Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64712-15 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Final 
Rule]. 
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)1, (d)1 (2012); Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64723. 
30 Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64758-62 
31 See id. at 64758. 
32 See Judy Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 13 (2015); Carlson & Herzog, supra 
note 17, at 29. 
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major questions canon, when determining issues of “vast economic and political significance.”33  
Those challenging the CPP argue that the EPA’s interpretation of BSER is not entitled to 
deference due to the economic significance of the agency’s attempt to restructure the energy 
sector.34 
This Comment assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments on both sides of 
these two crucial issues, and argues that the CPP ought to survive them.  In particular, the 
arguments in favor of reading § 111(d) to preclude the CPP are relatively weak, and under 
Chevron, a court should defer to the EPA’s interpretation.  Furthermore, interpreting § 111(d) to 
allow regulations beyond the fenceline is reasonable under Chevron step two.  Finally, the major 
questions canon should not be applied to invalidate the CPP.  The rule lacks a convincing 
rationale and the Court has not defined the criteria for administering it.  Moreover, recent cases 
in which the doctrine was applied are distinguishable from the context of the CPP.  
II. Statutory Background 
In order to implement the CPP, EPA relies on its authority under § 111(d) of the CAA.  
Section 111 was originally conceived as part of a “three-legged” approach to regulating air 
pollutants emitted from stationary sources. 35  Accordingly, §§ 107-110 of the CAA address 
“criteria pollutants,” “the presence of which in the ambient air results from numerous or diverse 
mobile or stationary sources,” and which “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”36   In addition, § 112 addresses “hazardous air pollutants” (“HAPs”) by 
                                                 
33 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).  See also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 
2489 (2015); Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000). 
34 See Utilities’s Stay Application, supra note 23, at 11; Business Associations’ Stay Application, supra note 24 at 
10-11; Coal Industry Stay Application, supra note 23, at 3; States’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 15. 
35 Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64700. 
36 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)1 (2012). 
 7 
establishing national emissions standards that for a list of designated pollutants that apply to a 
list of source categories.37  In light of these provisions, § 111 was originally conceived as a gap-
filler that would cover emissions of non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants that the EPA determined 
caused or contributed to “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”38  In particular, § 111(b) addresses emissions from new sources, while § 
111(d) covers existing sources.39  Existing sources within a particular category are subject to § 
111(d) only if new sources of the same category are already regulated under § 111(b).    
Section 111(d) authorizes regulations on a state-wide level.40  To accomplish this, the 
EPA establishes a “standard of performance for any existing source for any air pollutant.”41  The 
Act defines a “standard of performance” as “a standard for emissions of air pollutants which 
reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of 
emission reduction which . . . the Administrator determines has been adequately 
demonstrated.”42 Thus, to establish a standard of performance, the EPA identifies the BSER for a 
given air pollutant and source category and the emission reduction that would result from the 
implementation of that system.43  States are then required to develop a plan that would meet or 
exceed the emissions reductions achievable under the BSER.44  Under § 111(d), States may 
choose the method of achieving emissions reductions, but if a state plan fails to provide for the 
implementation or enforcement of standards that meet EPA guidelines, the EPA has the authority 
                                                 
37 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012); Robert R. Nordhaus & Avi Zevin, Historical Perpectives on § 111(d) of the 
Clean Air Act, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 11095, 11097 (2014). 
39 § 7411. 
40 § 7411(d). 
41 § 7411(d)(1).  
42 § 7411(a)(1) 
43 See § 7411(a)(1), (d)(1); Carbonell & Ceronsky, supra note 2, at 11087-11088. 
44 See § 7411(a)(1), (d)(1); 
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to substitute its own plan.45  Because fossil-fuel fired power plants are a listed source category 
and greenhouse gases are not defined as a criteria or hazardous pollutant,46 the EPA is relying on 
§ 111(d) for authority to implement the CPP, including the methods for emissions reduction 
suggested by the three building blocks.  
III. Chevron 
In 1984, the Supreme issued its landmark ruling in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council. At issue was the EPA’s interpretation of the term “stationary 
source” in the context of one of the CAA’s permitting requirements, which treated all of the 
pollution-emitting devices within a single industrial facility as though they were encased in a 
single “bubble.”47  Meanwhile, the Respondents argued that each individual pollution-emitting 
source constituted a discrete stationary source so long as it emitted over 100 tons of a pollutant.48  
To resolve this dispute, the Majority announced the following rule: “If the intent of Congress is 
clear  . . . the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.  If however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue . . . the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”49  
Applying this framework, the Majority noted that because the relevant provision of the 
CAA did not contain a definition of stationary source, the term’s meaning was unclear.50  Next, 
the Majority assessed the legislative history of the provision, and found that it too was unhelpful 
                                                 
45 See § 7411(d)(2)(A); Carbonell & Ceronsky, supra note 2, at 11087-11088. 
46 See §§ 7411(d)(1)(A)(i), 7412(b)(1); EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards (2016) available at 
http://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/criteria.html.  
47 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984). 
48 See id.at 859. 
49 Id. at 843. 
50 See id. at 860. 
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in clarifying the meaning of the term.51  However, the Majority did find that the legislative 
history clearly established the policy goals of the statute, and it upheld EPA’s interpretation 
because the agency had reasonably concluded that the plant-wide definition of stationary source 
was consistent with the intended policy.52 
Chevron’s two-step framework is now considered “foundational,” as the “undisputed 
starting point for any assessment of the allocation of authority between federal courts and 
administrative agencies.”53  Its central holding has been interpreted to mean that when a legal 
challenge involves an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute, the reviewing court 
must determine whether Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent (step one).54  If not, 
the Court must defer to any interpretation that is reasonable in light of the statute, its history, and 
the canons of statutory construction (step two).55  This approach resulted in a major transfer of 
interpretive authority to agencies.56  Prior to Chevron, judicial interpretation was the default rule.  
Deference to administrative agencies required special justification, and the amount of deference 
was determined on a sliding scale.57 Thus, Chevron’s two-step framework was revolutionary; 
                                                 
51 See id. at 862. 
52 See id. at 863. 
53 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006). 
54 Chevron’s applicability may be limited according to certain “step zero” considerations, which are not discussed in 
this Comment. See id at 207-22. 
55 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were 
committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its 
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” internal citations 
omitted). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 977 (1992). 
56 See Merrill, supra note 55, at 977. The extent to which Chevron shifts the balance of interpretive authority away 
from courts is often be limited in several ways.  First, the application of step one has been described as “erratic” with 
some courts finding ambiguity far less often than others.  See "How Clear Is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 1687, 191-92 (2005).  Second, the Supreme Court has limited the contexts in which Chevron applies 
at all. See Sunstein, supra note 53.  This Comment discusses one of these limiting principles, the major questions 
canon.  
57 See Merrill, supra note 55, at 977. 
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because once a reviewing court finds an ambiguity, it must automatically give maximum 
deference to the agency and accept any reasonable interpretation.58  
The Chevron Majority framed this rule in terms of an implicit Congressional delegation 
of authority to the executive. That is, Chevron relies on the assumption that by conferring 
authority to administer a statute to an agency, Congress implicitly delegates interpretive 
authority.59  This rationale relies on a legal fiction, which assumes that a hypothetical reasonable 
legislator intended agencies rather than courts to resolve statutory ambiguities.60  The Majority’s 
opinion in Chevron suggests two justifications for finding an implicit delegation.  First, the 
Majority notes that “the regulatory scheme is technical and complex,” and suggests that 
Congress may have wanted agencies “with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the provision” to resolve any ambiguities. 61   Second, the Majority notes that 
agency interpretations involve policy choices, which are more appropriately left to agencies 
because they democratically accountable, whereas the judiciary is not.62 
The twin rationales for the Chevron framework inform the manner in which courts should 
apply the doctrine at step one.  The task of determining whether a statute is ambiguous requires 
                                                 
58 See id. 
59 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (noting that “sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency . . . is implicit . . . .  
In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.”); Merrill, supra note 55, at 995. 
60 See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 200; Abigail R. Moncreiff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to 
Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 593, 608-09.  This has been referred to as the “delegation” theory of Chevron, which appears to be the 
prevailing theory of the case amongst the Justices on the Supreme Court.  See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 198.  
61 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
62 See id. at 865-66 (“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the 
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its 
judgments.  While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolve by the agency 
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”). See also Sunstein, supra note 53, at 
197. 
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courts to apply, explicitly or implicitly, some standard of clarity.63  In finding the appropriate 
standard, commentators have suggested that courts should be guided by the underlying 
justification for Chevron itself.64  This makes sense, given that step one determines whether or 
not deference should apply.  If the underlying justifications for deference are present, then a 
court should be more willing to find statutory ambiguity than it otherwise would be.  Although 
courts may apply step one inconsistently in practice,65 this Comment will assume that political 
accountability and agency expertise count in favor of finding ambiguity for the purposes of its 
analysis.   
A. Chevron and the Major Questions Exception 
The implicit delegation rationale serves as the basis for the major questions canon, which 
has been invoked to invalidate agency interpretations that are analyzed under Chevron.  
Commentators view FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. as the first mature expression 
of the doctrine.66   At issue was the FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA to include tobacco 
products.67  The Majority rejected this interpretation, finding that it was inconsistent with the 
intent of Congress, as expressed via the FDCA’s “overall regulatory scheme” and subsequent 
legislation involving tobacco. 68   More specifically, the Majority found that the FDA’s 
interpretation was not consistent with the term “safety” as it was used throughout the FDCA.69  
In addition, the Majority determined that if tobacco products were subject to the FDCA, they 
                                                 
63 See "How Clear Is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, supra note 56, at 1698. 
64 See id. at 1701-03. 
65 See id. at 1691-92.   
66 See Sunstien, supra note 53, at 240; Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 601. 
67 See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000). 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 160. 
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would have to be banned according to the terms of the statute.70  Yet, the Majority reasoned, 
Congress “has foreclosed the removal of tobacco products from the market,” insofar as it has 
“directly addressed the problem of tobacco and health through legislation on six occasions since 
1965.”71  The Majority interpreted these enactments as a ratification of the FDA’s previous 
position that it lacked the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco,72  and it concluded that Congress 
clearly intended to preclude the FDA from regulating tobacco products.73   
Brown & Williamson is notable for the manner in which it deploys Chevron step one.  At 
the outset, the Majority indicated that it was invalidating the FDA’s interpretation because it was 
inconsistent with the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”74  This would seem to be a 
straightforward application of the first step yet, towards the end of the opinion, the Majority 
again addressed Chevron, this time discussing its applicability in general, noting that “in 
extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has 
intended . . . an implicit delegation.”75  To support this proposition the Majority cited a passage 
from an essay authored by Justice Breyer in 1986, a time when Chevron’s scope remained a 
topic of debate.76  In that essay, then-Judge Breyer suggests the following: “A court may also ask 
whether the legal question is an important one.  Congress is more likely to have focused upon, 
and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the 
course of the statute’s daily administration.”77  On this basis, the Majority concluded: “we are 
                                                 
70 See id. at 137, 
71 Id. at 137 
72 See id. at 156. 
73 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161. 
74 Id. at 125-26. 
75 Id. at 159. 
76 See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 199. 
77 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. 
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confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and 
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”78 
 Since Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court has invoked the major questions canon 
on several occasions.  Most recently, in King v. Burwell, the Court denied deference to the IRS’ 
interpretation of the Affordable Care Act.  That case involved an interpretation governing tax 
credits for individuals who purchased health care on a federal exchange, as opposed to an 
exchange established by one of the states.79  Rather than apply Chevron, the Majority held that 
because the tax credits involved “billions of dollars in spending each year,” and affected “the 
price of health insurance for millions of people,” the interpretive issue was a “question of deep 
economic and political significance.” 80   Consequently, the Majority concluded that it was 
“especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no 
expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”81 
 In another recent case, UARG, the Majority stressed that the major questions canon was 
appropriate in the context of an expansion of agency authority that would have vast economic 
and political significance.  In that case, the Majority invalidated an EPA interpretation of the 
CAA’s permitting requirements as applied to GHG emissions.  The Majority was concerned that 
forcing stationary sources to acquire permits on the basis of GHG emissions would result in an 
absurd expansion of the number of sources that would be subject to the program.82  Specifically, 
it noted that under the EPA’s interpretation, the agency could require permits for “the 
construction and modification of tens of thousands, and the operation of millions, of small 
                                                 
78 Id. at 160. 
79 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2427, 2488 (2015). 
80 Id. at 2489.  
81 Id.. 
82 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2428 (2014) 
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sources nationwide.”83  Consequently, citing Brown & Williamson, it concluded that EPA’s 
interpretation was unreasonable within the framework of Chevron step two because it would 
result in “an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear 
congressional authorization.”84 
 Taken together, these cases illustrate two problems with the major questions canon, one 
theoretical and the other practical.  First, it appears to function as a broad exception to Chevron.  
In Brown & Williamson, the Majority discussed the economic and political significance of the 
FDA’s interpretation after it had concluded that the statute was unambiguous under Chevron step 
one.85  In UARG, the majority invoked the major questions canon at step two, as a basis for 
concluding that the EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable.86  Finally, the King majority never 
embarked on a Chevron analysis, and simply announced that the framework does not apply.87  
Consequently, the doctrine is not confined to any particular “step,” but operates as a mechanism 
for denying deference on issues deemed sufficiently important. 
 But it is unclear why courts should assume interpretive authority over major questions.  
As several commentators have observed, the major questions canon lacks a persuasive 
justification in light of the two widely accepted justifications for Chevron—technical expertise 
                                                 
83 Id. at 2444. 
84 Id. 
85 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160. 
86 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because . . . .”). 
87 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89.  There is debate as to whether the major questions canon should be interpreted as 
a discrete exception to Chevron.  Some argue that Brown & Williamson should be interpreted as a Chevron step one 
case, with the implication being that “political and economic significance” is only relevant insofar as it suggests that 
Congress’ intent is unambiguous.  See Sunstien, supra note 53, at 247.  Others interpret the major questions canon as 
a broad exception to Chevron.  See Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 603.  The difference may be more theoretical than 
practical.  Under both analyses, an agency will not be entitled to deference when a reviewing court determines that a 
dispute involves a “major question,” either because the statute is unambiguous or because Chevron does not apply. 
See “How Clear is Clear” In Chevron’s Step One?, supra note 55 (interpreting Brown & Williamson as a step one 
case, and suggesting that courts adjust the standard of clarity at step one to deny deference to agencies when 
addressing a major question.).  In either case, the same fundamental problem of administering the doctrine remain, 
as there does not appear to be a metric for determining what constitutes a major question. 
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and political accountability.88  If, as Chevron suggests, courts should defer to agencies because 
they possess more technical expertise than judges, and because policy decisions are best 
determined by politically accountable branches of government, then Chevron should apply to 
economically and politically significant issues as well.  In King, the Majority indicates that it is 
concerned with technical expertise, and its rationale for invoking the major questions canon is 
that the IRS is the wrong agency for determining health care policy.89  But in UARG the Majority 
suggests a different rationale, which is that courts should assume interpretive authority when an 
agency attempts to enlarge its own jurisdiction.90  But conceptualizing the major questions canon 
in terms of a rule against agency self-aggrandizement also lacks a compelling justification in 
light of Chevron.  This is because agency interpretations that result in broader authority also 
involve technical expertise and political accountability.  Thus, assuming that an agency’s 
rulemaking was motivated purely out of a bad faith desire for increased power, it would still be 
subject to political forces that would force it to develop “compelling technical and political 
reasons for [its] decisions.”91 
Another problem with the major questions canon is that there is no criterion for 
administering the doctrine.  In each major questions case, the Court simply relies on the phrase 
“economic and political significance” without explaining where the line is drawn. For instance, 
the King Majority cites the fact that the ACA tax credits constituted “billions of dollars in 
spending” and affected “millions of people.92  But what if it only involved millions in spending 
and affected thousands of people, would the major questions canon still apply?  The Court leaves 
                                                 
88 See Sunstien, supra note 53, at  242-44; Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 606-616.   
89 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
90 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.  
91 See Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 614 (arguing against a self-aggrandizing justification for the major questions 
canon).  
92 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.  
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this question unanswered.93  Moreover, the apparent source of the doctrine, Justice Breyer’s 
essay, also fails to address the issue.94  Breyer himself has indicated that he viewed “majorness” 
as one of several factors that would determine how much deference a court would apply.95    
IV. Legal Challenges 
This Comment addresses two arguments that are likely to figure prominently in the legal 
challenge against the CPP.  First, a reviewing court will be forced to answer the threshold 
question of whether § 112 precludes regulation of existing sources under § 111(d).  This will 
require judicial review of a longstanding drafting error, which will be an issue of first 
impression.96  Second, recent decisions involving EPA interpretations of the CAA suggest that 
the “fenceline” issue will play a major role in a challenge before the Supreme Court, as at least 
four Justices have expressed concern over the breadth of EPA’s statutory authority to regulate air 
pollutants.97  In addition, EPA’s asserted authority to regulate beyond the fenceline constitutes 
the central premise of the CPP as well as an unprecedented expansion of regulatory power with 
respect to air pollution and GHG’s in particular.  Consequently, the resolution of this issue will 
likely have a lasting impact on future EPA action under the CAA. 
A. The Drafting Error Argument 
                                                 
93 See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 243 (arguing that the major questions doctrine should not be applied as an 
exception to Chevron because there is no way to administer the distinction between interstitial and major questions 
and because agency expertise and political accountability are relevant to the resolution of major questions); 
Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 621 (noting that the major questions exception lacks “a workable rationale.”).  
94 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370-71. 
95 Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 611 n.72. 
96 See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11095.  
97 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134, S. Ct. 2427 (2014); E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 134 
S. Ct. 1584 (2014); Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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In 1990, Congress amended the CAA and passed two different, potentially conflicting 
versions of § 111(d).98  Prior to the 1990 amendments, § 111(d)(1) applied to “any air pollutant 
for which air quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included on a list published 
under section 108(a) or 112(b)(1)(a).”99   Consistent with § 111(d)’s role as a gap-filler for 
pollutants that were not covered by the criteria pollutant and HAP programs, this language was 
interpreted to exclude three categories of air pollutants: those for which air quality criteria have 
not been issued, those listed in § 108(a), and those listed in § 112(b)(1)(a).100  In amending this 
provision in 1990, the Senate merely updated the cross-reference to reflect changes to § 112, 
substituting “§ 112” for “§ 112(b)(1)(a).”101  Meanwhile the House version contains the language 
that currently appears in the U.S. Code:102 “for any air pollutant for which air quality criteria 
have not been issued or which is not included on a list published under [§ 108(a)] of this title or 
emitted from a source category which is regulated under [§ 112] of this title.”103     
Opponents of the CPP argue that the House version precludes the EPA from regulating 
CO2 emissions from power plants under § 111(d).  On this view, the language of the House 
version is unambiguous, and by its plain meaning § 111(d)(1) explicitly excludes pollutants 
regulated under § 108(a) as well as any air pollutant emitted from  a source category regulated 
under § 112. 104   Opponents also argue that this interpretation is consistent with the 1990 
amendments, which revised § 112 to authorize regulations according to source categories rather 
                                                 
98 See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11098. 
99 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 111(d)(1)(A), 1684 (1970). 
100 See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11100. 
101 See id. at 11098. 
102 The Senate version is included in the Statutes at Large.   
103 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
104 See Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 23, at 15-18; Final Brief of the States of West Virginia, 
Alabama, Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming 
as Intervenors in Support of the Petitioner at 4, 6-12, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151) [hereinafter Murray Energy States’ Brief].   
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than pollutants.105  As a result of this change, opponents contend that § 111(d)(1) was similarly 
amended to exclude § 112 source categories rather than pollutants, so as to avoid subjecting 
existing sources to simultaneous national and state-wide standards under §§  112 and 111(d), 
respectively.106  Because § 112 authorizes the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, which apply to 
power plants, this reading of the House version would invalidate the CPP.107  
In addition, proponents of this view argue that Congress never intended to pass the 
Senate version of § 111(d).  In the absence of any legislative history clarifying the intended 
scope of the § 111(d) exception,108 opponents of the CPP rely on the textual structure of the 1990 
amendments.  Accordingly, they note that the House version appears among several substantive 
changes to the Act, whereas the Senate version is included among a list of “clerical” changes 
under the heading “Conforming Amendments.”109   The Senate Legislative Drafting Manual 
stipulates that conforming amendments are “necessitated by the substantive amendments or 
provisions of the bill.” 110   Thus, the Senate version, which replaces “112(b)(1)(A)” with 
“112(b),” 111  corresponds with the need to update the cross-reference to § 112 in light of 
substantive amendments made to that section.112  Yet, the House version also replaces this cross-
reference, substituting “112(b)(1)(A)” with “or emitted from a source category which is 
regulated under section 112.”113  In light of this conflict, opponents of the CPP argue that the 
                                                 
105 See, e.g., Coal Industry Stay Application, supra note 23, at 13-15. 
106 See, e.g., id. 
107 See, Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11098. 
108 See id. at 1103 (“[T]here is no obvious congressional purpose undergirding the dueling amendments. There are 
no floor statements or committee reports that directly answer the question of what Congress intended when 
amending § 111(d) in the 1990 CAA.”). 
109 See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 104, at 7-8; Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 23, at 30-
31. 
110 Senate Legislative Drafting Manual § 126(b)(2)(A).  
111 Clean Air Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302, (1990); see Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra 
note 22, at 30-31.  
112 See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 103, at 9. 
113 Clean Air Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108, (1990). 
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Drafter’s intended to pass the House version because a conforming amendment would never be 
intended to qualify a substantive amendment. 114   Consequently, they argue that the Senate 
version was included in the final draft of the amendments by mistake, and should not be given 
effect.115 
Alternatively, opponents also argue that even if a court were to consider the Senate 
version, it should give effect to both provisions and interpret them to exclude — in addition to 
criteria pollutants—both any HAP emitted from any source and any air pollutant emitted from a 
source category regulated under § 112. 116   Opponents contend that principles of statutory 
construction require a court to give maximum effect to the language in each provision, and that 
therefore this reading constitutes the only permissible interpretation of both provisions. 117  
Moreover, proponents argue that because the 1990 amendments expanded the scope of § 112, 
this interpretation is consistent with the overall structure of the Act insofar as it narrows the gap 
covered by § 111(d).118  
Unsurprisingly, the EPA rejects both of these arguments and takes the position that § 
111(d) authorizes the regulation of CO2 from power plants.  Instead, the agency gives effect to 
both versions of the 1990 amendments and construes them as having the same meaning within 
                                                 
114 See Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 22, at 33.  The entity responsible for preparing the U.S. Code, 
the House Office of the Law Revision Counsel, resolved this conflict by applying the amendments in the order in 
which they appear.  See id. at 30-31 (noting that Congress and the House Office of the Law Revision Counsel have 
established a rule whereby an amendment will not be included in the U.S. Code if “a prior amendment in the same 
bill removes or alters the text that the subsequent amendment would amend.”).  Accordingly, because the cross-
reference to § 112 had already been deleted by operation of the prior amendment containing the House version, the 
Senate version “could not be executed” and was not included in the U.S. Code.  See id.(quoting the Office’s 
amendment note).  
115 See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 112. 
116 See id. at 14-15. 
117 See id. at 13. 
118 See Groten, supra note 23, at 10121 (noting that Congress completely rewrote § 112, adding a list of 188 HAPs 
to regulate).  
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the context of the CPP.119  Accordingly, the EPA argues that the Senate version is clear and 
unambiguous, and that its plain meaning excludes regulation of pollutants that are listed in § 
112.120  With regards to the House version, the EPA argues that the language is ambiguous, and 
that in light of the CAA’s history and structure, the only reasonable interpretation is that it 
excludes air pollutants listed in § 112 that are also emitted from source categories regulated 
under § 112.121  On this reading, the § 111(d) exclusion does not preclude the CPP, because CO2 
is not a HAP subject to § 112.122 
Whereas opponents of the CPP assume that the House version’s language is clear, the 
EPA’s position suggests that it should be entitled to deference under Chevron step two. 123  To 
support this view, the EPA argues that the House version is susceptible to numerous 
interpretations.124  To illustrate, recall that § 111(d)(1) provides as follows: 
“The Administrator shall shall prescribe regulations . . . under which each 
State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which establishes standards of 
performance for any existing source for any air pollutant [clause 1] for which air 
quality criteria have not been issued or [clause 2] which is not included on a list 
published under [§ 108(a)] of this title or [clause 3] emitted from a source 
category which is regulated under [§ 112] of this title.”125 
 
Opponents of the CPP read the three clauses as simultaneous requirements, such that § 111(d) 
only applies to air pollutants that meet all three conditions.  This reading imputes a conjunctive 
relationship between the three clauses, effectively replacing each “or” with an “and.”  Yet, as 
EPA and others have noted,126 the disjunctive “or” that connects each clause supports a literal 
                                                 
119 See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715. 
120 See id. at 64712.  This interpretation is not in dispute. 
121 See id. at 64714-15. 
122 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). 
123 See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64712. 
124 See id. at 64713. 
125 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012) (numbering added). 
126 See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713; Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11105. 
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interpretation that allows the EPA to regulate any air pollutant when either air quality criteria 
have not been established for that pollutant or the pollutant is either not listed in § 108(a) or not 
emitted from a source category listed in § 112.  On this reading, § 111(d) would authorize the 
EPA to regulate any air pollutant for which air quality criteria have not been issued, regardless of 
whether it is subject to regulation under § 112.127  
The plain text of the House version also supports an interpretation that expressly 
authorizes the regulation of air pollutants that are emitted from a source category that is subject 
to § 112.  Unlike the first two clauses which are stated in the negative (“for which air quality 
criteria have not been issued . . . which is not on a list published under [§ 108(a)]”), the third 
clause is stated in the positive.  Opponents of the CPP rely on an interpretation of the House 
version that implicitly repeats the negative from clause 2, reading clause 3 as “which is not 
emitted from a source category which is regulated under § 112,” to conclude that § 111(d) 
prohibits rather than authorizes the regulation of pollutants emitted from § 112 source categories. 
But as the EPA points out, this interpretation relies on a presumption, not the plain text of the 
House version.128 
Because the plain text of the House version supports multiple readings, the EPA argues 
that it is ambiguous. 129  Thus, in anticipation of Chevron step two, the EPA advances an 
interpretation that does not preclude the CPP, which the agency argues is reasonable in light of § 
111(d)’s purpose as a gap-filler covering non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants.   The EPA’s 
definition diverges from the plain text of the House version in the same manner as its opponents’ 
                                                 
127 See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713. Because air quality criteria have not bee issued for CO2, this 
interpretation would not preclude the CPP.  See id.  Nevertheless, the EPA rejects this interpretation as unreasonable 
because it would undermine § 111(d)’s historical purpose as a gap-filler by eliminating the relationship between § 
111(d) and § 112 altogether.  See id.  
128 Id.  The EPA also rejects this interpretation as unreasonable because it would allow for the regulation of HAPs 
that are already subject to § 112 regulations. See id.  
129 Id. at 64712-14. 
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interpretation, construing the three clauses as conjunctives, and reading a negative “which is not” 
in to the third clause.130  However, unlike its opponents, the EPA does not read the “emitted from 
a source category which is regulated under [§ 112]  as a broad exclusion of source categories 
listed under § 112 regardless of the pollutant subject to regulation under § 111(d).131  Instead, the 
EPA argues that “regulated under [§ 112]” only refers to HAP emissions.132  Therefore, when 
“regulated under [§ 112] modifies “source categories,”  it means that source categories listed 
under § 112 are excluded when the pollutant subject to § 111(d) regulation is also a HAP listed 
in § 112.133  In this manner, the EPA reads the House version as a similar, but more narrow 
exclusion than the Senate version.  Whereas the Senate version excludes pollutants that are listed 
under § 112, the EPA argues that the House version should be read to exclude § 112 pollutants 
emitted from § 112 source categories.134  
The EPA argues that this reading is reasonable because it is consistent with the structure 
of the Act and Congress’ intent.  First, the EPA notes that because “emitted from a source 
category which is regulated under [§ 112]” modifies “any air pollutant,” it makes more sense to 
interpret the clause as an exclusion of pollutants rather than source categories.135  Second, the 
EPA argues that its interpretation is consistent with the structure of the CAA because it does not 
leave a regulatory gap for harmful pollutants that are not regulated under the criteria or HAP 
programs.136  By contrast, the alternative interpretation adopted by the opponents of the CPP 
would prevent the EPA from regulating harmful non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants emitted from a 
                                                 
130 See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64714. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. at 64715. 
136 See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715 
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source category that is subject to regulation under § 112.137  But, the EPA argues, there is no 
evidence to suggest that Congress intended to narrow § 111(d) coverage when it passed the 1990 
amendments.138  Finally, because the EPA recognizes both versions of § 111(d), it argues that its 
interpretation of the House version is reasonable because it is consistent with the Senate 
version.139 
B. Resolving the Drafting Error Argument 
Ultimately, because the dispute involves an agency’s interpretation of a statute, the 
drafting error issue hinges on a court’s application of Chevron.  If a reviewing court determines 
that Congress did not intend to pass the Senate amendment to § 111(d), it will still have to 
determine whether the House version is ambiguous, as the EPA argues.  Otherwise, a court may 
determine that it must give effect to both versions. 140  In this event, opponents of the CPP argue 
that the Senate version should be ‘added’ to their interpretation of the House version to create a 
broader exclusion that combines the two provisions.  On the other hand, the EPA argues that the 
two versions are consistent with one another.  Consequently, to address each side’s arguments, a 
reviewing court will have to resolve the meaning of the House version regardless of whether it 
decides to give effect to the Senate version. 
1. The House Amendment Is Ambiguous 
                                                 
137 See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 26, West Virginia v. E.P.A., No. 15A773 (U.S. 
Feb. 4, 2016) (noting that § 112 lists 140 source categories). 
138 See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715. 
139 See id. 
140 See Scialabba v. Cuella de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).  A majority applied Chevron to a statute that 
contained two conflicting provisions, and three Justices concluded that in cases of direct conflict, Chevron does not 
apply.  To the extent that a court interprets the House and Senate amendments as being in direct conflict, Scialabba 
suggests that Chevron would apply to an interpretation that gives effect to both.  Nevertheless, as the EPA’s 
argument demonstrates, the two provisions are not necessarily in conflict, depending on how the House version is 
interpreted. 
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A reviewing court should find that the House version of § 111(d) is ambiguous.  First, as 
the EPA points out, the most natural reading of the text does not make sense in light of the 
statute’s purpose as a gap-filler.  Because the natural reading of the word “or” results in a series 
of disjunctive conditions, the text of the House amendment suggests that § 111(d) applies to any 
pollutant for which air quality criteria have not been established or which is either not listed in § 
108(a) or not emitted from a source category listed in § 112.  Yet this construction conflicts with 
the purpose of the exclusion, as both sides agree that § 111(d) was intended to cover the 
regulatory gaps between §§ 108 and 112 without overlapping with those programs.141  If “or” is 
allowed to have its natural meaning, then the House version of § 111(d) would allow overlapping 
regulations of pollutants covered by § 108(a) (if either air quality criteria have not been 
established, or if the pollutant is not emitted by a § 112 source category) as well as pollutants 
emitted from a source category listed in § 112 (if either air quality criteria have not been 
established, or if the pollutant is not listed in § 108(a)).  
 In addition to finding textual evidence of ambiguity, a court should also analyze the step 
one issue in terms of institutional choice.  In this regard, the court must consider whether it 
makes sense to assume that a rational legislator would have intended the EPA to have 
interpretive authority over the CAA.  Of course, Chevron itself answers this question to some 
extent.  As the Court recognized in that case, the EPA should be entitled to deference when 
interpreting a complex statute within its area of expertise.  More specifically, the Court has 
already recognized the EPA as “expert agency” with regards to the regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions.142  Moreover, although the EPA is an independent agency,143  the CPP is a clear 
                                                 
141 See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715; Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 23, at 21-29.  
142 See American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 427 (2011). 
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reflection of executive branch policymaking, in that it was promulgated at the president’s 
request.  Thus, the EPA’s attendant interpretations of the CAA reflect policy choices that were 
made by a politically accountable branch of government.  On the bases of agency expertise and 
political accountability, a reviewing court’s standard of clarity should be relatively stringent, in 
favor of deference. Therefore, given the textual difficulties inherent in the House version of § 
111(d), as well as the rationale for deference under Chevron, a reviewing court should conclude 
that it is ambiguous and analyze the EPA’s interpretation under Chevron step two. 
Alternatively, it is possible that a reviewing court will apply Chevron in a manner that 
recognizes the dueling amendments at the outset, rather than proceeding to analyze the House 
amendment for ambiguity first.  In this case, the analysis at step one is more straightforward: the 
mere fact that the 1990 amendments included two potentially conflicting versions of the same 
statutory text is itself sufficient evidence that Congress failed to speak clearly on the issue.  Thus, 
by giving effect to the Senate version, a reviewing court should recognize that the 
inconsistencies between the two versions creates ambiguity.   
This possibility presupposes a court’s willingness to recognize the Senate version – 
something which the CPP’s opponents strenuously object to.  But, it is settled law that when the 
two conflict, the Statutes at Large take precedence over the U.S. Code.144  Moreover, opponents 
of the CPP have no basis for assuming that the Senate did not intend to pass their version of § 
111(d) simply because they inserted the updated cross-reference as a conforming amendment 
                                                                                                                                                             
143 "How Clear Is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, supra note 56, at 1701 (noting Justice Kagan’s position that less 
deference should be accorded for independent agencies on the political accountability justification of the Chevron 
doctrine).  
144 See United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n.4 (1964) (citing Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 
(1943) “the Code cannot prevail over the Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent.”). 
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following the House version.145  Consequently, there is no reason why a court should ignore the 
Senate version.         
2. The EPA’s Interpretation of the House Amendment is Reasonable 
Assuming a reviewing court gets to step two, it should find that the EPA’s interpretation 
of the House amendment to § 111(d) is reasonable.  First, the agency’s reading is faithful to the 
exclusion’s pre-1990 purpose.  That is, unlike the competing interpretation, which would create a 
wholesale exclusion for specific source categories, it would limit § 111(d)’s applicability to non-
criteria and non-HAP pollutants.  Thus, the EPA’s interpretation avoids creating a new 
regulatory gap with regards to non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants when they are emitted from 
source categories listed under § 112.  Second, this reading reconciles the House and Senate 
versions, and avoids creating a conflict within the statute.  In this regard, the EPA’s 
interpretation is consistent with the canons of statutory construction.146 
  Assuming a reviewing court agrees with this analysis, it will affirm the statutory 
predicate for the CAA, allowing the EPA to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants under § 
111(d).  Nevertheless, having cleared this threshold issue the rule faces a second compelling 
challenge, this time against the scope of the EPA’s statutory authority to regulate CO2 emissions 
under § 111(d).  
C. The Fenceline Issue 
In order to implement building block 2 and 3 and regulate beyond the fenceline, the EPA 
relies on an interpretation of “standard of performance” that encompasses the entire energy grid, 
                                                 
145 See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11100. 
146 See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 220 (Sotomayor, Breyer, Thomas (partial) JJ., dissenting) (noting that the Court has a 
duty “to fit, if possible, all parts of a statute into a harmonious whole.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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rather than each individual power-generating facility.  According to § 111(a), a standard of 
performance “reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the 
best system of emission reduction.”147 Because the Act does not define “system,” the EPA has 
adopted an interpretation based on the plain meaning of the term, defining it as “a set of things or 
parts forming a complex whole.” 148   Accordingly, the EPA defines “system of emission 
reduction” as “a set of measures that work together to reduce emissions.”149  
In addition, under § 111(d)(1) a standard of performance applies for “any existing 
source.” 150   Section 111(d) defines an existing source as any existing “building, structure, 
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.”151  For the purposes of the 
CPP, the EPA interprets “source” to include the owners and operators of any “building, structure, 
facility, or installation for which a standard of performance is applicable.”152  Consequently, the 
EPA interprets a “system of emission reduction” as a series of measures that power plant owners 
and operator may implement to meet the emissions limits set by the CPP.153  
The immediate consequence of the EPA’s interpretation of § 111 is that the CPP’s 
emissions standards are not limited by what is achievable through on-site improvements.  As a 
result, the EPA’s calculation of achievable emissions reductions anticipates measures outside of 
the fenceline, such as investments in renewable energy and natural gas and purchases of 
emissions credits.154  In fact, EPA concedes that no pollution control technique or process can be 
                                                 
147 42 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012). 
148 Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64762. 
149 Id. 
150 § 111(d)(1). 
151 See §§ 111(d)(a)(3), (6).  
152 Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64762. 
153 See id. 
154 Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64726. 
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installed at an existing coal-fired plant to achieve the CPP’s emissions standards.155 Thus, the 
CPP will essentially force a reduction in fossil-fuel-fired power and transform the nation’s 
energy mix, reducing the amount of coal-fired power from 41% of the nation’s energy supply to 
27% by 2030, with natural gas and renewables making up the difference.156 
Opponents of the CPP argue that the EPA lacks the authority to regulate beyond the 
fenceline for two reasons.  First, they argue that the language and structure of § 111 
unambiguously precludes the EPA’s interpretation.  Second, opponents argue that because of the 
scope of the mandated reductions in coal-fired power output, the CPP invokes a “major 
question” of vast “economic and political significance” without clear authorization from 
Congress.  
The first argument focuses on the EPA’s conflation of sources with their owners and 
operators.  Section 111 defines the term “owner or operator” separately from “existing source” 
and “stationary source.”157  Moreover, § 111(d) explicitly authorizes performance standards “for 
any existing source,” making no mention of a source’s owners or operators.158  The Act further 
distinguishes between sources and their owners and operators in § 111(e), which provides that “it 
shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation 
of any standard of performance applicable to such source.”159  Thus, opponents of the CPP argue 
that EPA’s interpretation conflicts with the unambiguous meaning of the statute because 
Congress intended to classify sources and their owners and operators separately, by providing 
                                                 
155 Utilities’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 6. 
156 See id. at 7.  
157 See § 7411(a)(5) defining “owner or operator” as “any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises 
a stationary source.”  
158  § 7411(d). 
159 42 U.S.C. § 7411(e) (2012). 
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those terms with distinct meanings, and addressing each separately in various provisions of § 
111.160 
The second argument against EPA’s attempts to regulate beyond the fenceline invokes 
the “major questions” doctrine.  Challengers assert that the CPP constitutes a radical and 
unprecedented expansion of the EPA’s authority into an area where it lacks expertise, 
transforming the agency into an energy regulator intent on reconfiguring the nation’s energy 
supply.161  Consequently, invoking King and UARG, they  argue that the CPP involves a major 
question of economic and political significance, and that the EPA has acted without a clear 
Congressional mandate, thereby overstepping the bounds of its authority under § 111.162    
For its part, the EPA maintains that Congress did speak clearly when it authorized the 
agency to determine the “best system of emissions reduction” for existing sources.163  According 
to the EPA, the expansive plain meaning of “system” encompasses the beyond-the-fenceline 
measures implicated in building blocks 2 and 3.164  Furthermore, the EPA maintains that its 
interpretation is reasonable because on-site improvements would either be too expensive or 
ineffective in curbing CO2 emissions.165  Finally, the EPA points out that power plants already 
rely on generation-shifting and other off-site measures to comply with existing CAA regulations 
that regulate beyond the fenceline.166 
                                                 
160 See, e.g., Business Associations’ Stay Application, supra note 24, at 9-11.  
161 See, e.g., id. at 16-17; 
162 See, e.g., id. 
163 See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 137, at 34.  
164 See id. At 35. The EPA adopts the dictionary definition of “system,” as a “set of connected things or parts 
forming a complex whole.”  
165 See id. At 37-38. 
166 See id. at 40 (referring to the acid rain program implemented as part of the 1990 amendments to the CAA.  These 
amendments contemplated generation-shifting and emissions credits trading. See Legal Memorandum 
Accompanying Clean Power Plan for Certain Issues, 88-91). See also id. at  43 (referring to sulfur emissions 
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In addition, the EPA argues that it is reasonable to include owners and operators within 
the definition of “source,” out of practical necessity.  This is because pollution control strategies 
must always be carried out by a plant’s owner or operator, regardless of whether they occur 
within the boundaries of the physical plant.167  Thus, the agency argues, just like any other 
pollution-control efforts, generation-shifting measures must be implemented by owners and 
operators of the affected source.  
D. Resolving The Fenceline Issue 
Once again, both of the arguments marshalled by challengers to the CPP against the 
EPA’s authority to regulate beyond the fenceline implicate the Chevron doctrine.  The textual 
argument against conflating sources with their owners or operators implicitly relies on Chevron 
step one, because it asserts that the EPA’s interpretation is contrary to the unambiguous meaning 
of § 111.  Similarly, by invoking the “major questions” doctrine and the EPA’s lack of expertise 
in energy regulation, opponents of the CPP seek to disqualify an interpretation of § 111 that 
would allow measures implemented outside of the physical boundaries of an affected power 
plant.  Curiously, unlike its response to the drafting error argument, the EPA does not explicitly 
argue that the relevant provisions of the Act are ambiguous.  This suggests that the EPA is 
staking its claim at Chevron step one, and implicitly asserting that building blocks 2 and 3 are 
consistent with the unambiguous meaning of the Act.  It is possible that a reviewing court will 
accept this view and resolve the fenceline issue at step one; however, the scope of “best system 
of emission reduction” has never been analyzed under Chevron.168  It is not inconceivable that a 
                                                                                                                                                             
standards promulgated under § 111(b), for which the EPA determined that the “best system” should take into 
account third-party off-site fuel cleaning).  
167 See id. at 44 (arguing that “buildings, structures, facilities, and installations, obviously are incapable of taking 
such steps on their own.” (internal citations omitted)).  
168 See Freeman, supra note 32, at 12. 
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court will find the term ambiguous and analyze the fenceline issue under Chevron step two.169  If 
this were to happen, the EPA might still lose a legal challenge despite being able to demonstrate 
the reasonableness of its interpretations, if challengers can convince the court that building 
blocks 2 and 3 raise a “major question” of economic and political significance, without clear 
Congressional authorization.   
1. The Plain Meaning of “Best System of Emission Reduction” Permits 
Regulating Beyond the Fenceline  
Within the context of § 111, the meaning of “best system” is less nebulous than it appears 
on its own.  For instance, the Act provides that the EPA must evaluate the costs, non-air-
pollution-related health and environmental impacts, and energy requirements of any proposed 
emissions standard to determine whether it is “best.”170  Moreover, § 111(a)(1) stipulates that the 
“best system” must be “adequately demonstrated” and “achievable.”171   
Within this framework, beyond the fenceline emissions reduction strategies like 
generation-shifting and emissions credit trading make sense for a number of reasons. First, the 
CPP’s emissions targets meet the statutory criteria for “best.”  Greater reliance on natural gas and 
renewables will not have a net negative impact on public health or the environment. 172  In 
addition, the EPA concluded that limiting the performance standard to what is achievable 
                                                 
169  See id. at 13 (noting that a reviewing court might find “best system” ambiguous); Carlson & Herzog, supra note 
17, at 35 (predicting that a reviewing court will analyze the fenceline issue at step two). 
170 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (“[T]aking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality 
health and environmental impact and energy requirements.”).   
171 Id. 
172 See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64721 (noting that the D.C. Circuit’s has interpreted “best” to mean that a rule 
must not do more harm than good in terms of public health and the environment); See id. at 64751 (concluding that 
no combination of the building blocks will result in negative non-air health and environmental impacts).  
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through on-site improvements would either be too costly or ineffective.173  By regulating beyond 
the fenceline, the EPA aims to reduce the energy sector’s CO2 emissions by 16%, at a cost that 
does not exceed prior rules promulgated for power plants under the Act.174   In addition, the EPA 
determined that there was sufficient unused natural gas and renewable generation capacity, such 
that generation-shifting would not negatively impact the energy supply.175  Second, the EPA 
found that the displacement of coal and other fossil fuels in favor of natural gas and renewables 
was “achievable” in light of the available capacity and prevailing trend towards greater reliance 
on natural gas and renewables within the industry.176  Finally, the EPA concluded that building 
blocks 2 and 3 are “adequately demonstrated” because power plants currently have the capacity 
to invest in alternative fuel sources in order to reduce emissions, 177  if they do not do so 
already.178  Thus, a court should find that the pollution-reduction measures anticipated by the 
three building blocks are authorized under the plain meaning of “best system of emission 
reduction” as that term is used in § 111.  
In addition, the conflation of sources with their owners and operators does not violate the 
meaning of § 111.  Instead, the EPA has merely recognized the practical reality that inanimate 
“stationary sources”— as that term is defined in § 111(a)—are incapable of actually 
implementing any type of pollution control measure themselves, whether it be inside or outside 
the fenceline.  Thus, although challengers are correct to note the manner in which the statute 
                                                 
173 See id. at 64751. 
174 See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 137, at 39. 
175 See id. at 38. 
176 See id. at 38-39.  
177 See Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir 1973) (defining an “adequately 
demonstrated system” as one that can “reasonably be expected to serve the interests of pollution control without 
becoming exorbitantly costly in an economic or environmental way.”); Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64746, 64747 
(describing how power plant owners can invest in natural gas burning and renewable sources to offset CO2 
emissions from fossil-fuel burning sites). 
178 See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 137, at 40 (noting that some state 
programs already rely on generation shifting to reduce CO2 emissions).  
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distinguishes “owners and operators” and “source,” their argument is ultimately specious; any 
emissions standard promulgated under § 111 necessarily relies on actions taken by source 
owners and operators for compliance.  This is why § 111(e) holds owners and operators 
responsible for implementing the standards formulated under § 111(d).     
2. Building Blocks 2 and 3 Are Reasonable in Light of Congressional 
Intent And Past Rulemaking 
Assuming a court finds the term “best system of emission reduction” ambiguous, it 
should affirm building blocks 2 and 3 because they are consistent with congressional intent and 
prior regulations under the Act.  When Congress amended the CAA in 1977, it explicitly 
recognized that regulations promulgated under § 111 would impact the energy sector.179  This 
trend has continued, as the 1990 amendments added the HAPs provisions to the CAA, imposing 
emissions standards on both new and existing electric generating units.180  Congress therefore 
anticipated that pollution reduction would affect energy production when it drafted the CAA.   
Moreover, Congress has previously authorized beyond the fenceline measures within the 
CAA.  To address acid rain, the 1990 amendments established a cap-and-trade program for sulfur 
dioxide emissions from fossil fuel-fired sources and encouraged substitution of renewable 
sources. 181   When it revised § 111(a)(1) in 1977, Congress specifically provided that the 
                                                 
179 See Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 657 F.2d 298, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the Senate and House Reports 
indicated that Congress was using “a long-term lens with a broad focus on . . . environmental and energy effects of 
different technological systems when it discussed section 111.”).  The focus on the energy impacts of pollution 
control was also apparent in the 1977 amendments to the criteria pollutant program, which shares the same federal-
state implementation framework as § 111.  See 42 U.S. C. § 7409(d)(2) (2012) (providing for the appointment of an 
“independent scientific review committee” to, inter alia, advise on the “energy effects which may result from 
various strategies for attainment and maintenance of such national ambient air quality standards.”). 
180 See 42 § 7412(b), (d)(2)-(3) (2012). 
181 See 42 § 7651(b) (2012). 
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precursor to the term “best system of emission reduction”182 should be broad enough to permit 
the EPA to require fuel treatment that was typically conducted offsite by third parties. 183  
Although Congress updated § 111(a)(1) in 1990, it expanded the definition of “standards of 
performance.” 184   Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intends § 111(d) 
standards of performance to allow beyond the fenceline measures, including acts by third parties.     
Finally, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged the reasonableness of certain beyond 
the fenceline measures in the air pollution context.  In E.P.A. v. EME Homer, the Supreme Court 
recently affirmed the EPA’s interpretation of the Transport Rule—a provision of the CAA that 
regulates “downwind” emissions between states—which provided for an emissions credit trading 
system.185  Applying Chevron, a six-Justice Majority found that the CAA’s Transport Rule failed 
to specify how the EPA should divide responsibility for nonattainment of emissions standards in 
downwind states between multiple upwind polluters.186  The Majority deferred to the EPA’s 
solution, which it found efficient and equitable, and therefore reasonable.187 
In light of the history of the CAA and past rulemakings, a reviewing court should not find 
the EPA’s interpretation of § 111 unreasonable merely because it calls for outside the fenceline 
measures or relies on the actions of third parties.  Nevertheless, at this stage of the analysis, the 
reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation of “best system of emission reduction” remains an 
                                                 
182 The 1977 amendments defined “standard of performance” in terms of a “technological system of continuous 
emission reduction.”  The pre-1977 language (“best system of emission reduction”) was restored pursuant to the 
1990 amendments. See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64765-66.  
183 See 1977 CAA Legis. Hist. at 2655. 
184 See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64765-66 (explaining the distinction between “technological system of 
continuous emission reduction” and “best system of emission reduction”).  
185 See E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1597 n.10 (2014). 
186 See id. at 1604. 
187 See id. at 1607. 
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open question, as the “major questions” doctrine looms as a general exception to deference that 
can be invoked at step one or two. 
3. The Fenceline Issue Does Not Raise a Major Question of Economic and 
Political Significance 
Even if a court decides that the it is reasonable to interpret § 111(d) as authorizing 
regulations that rely on actions taken outside the fenceline, it could still invalidate the CPP on the 
grounds that the extent of the mandated displacement of fossil fuel-fired power is sufficient to 
raise a “major question.”  The problem with any analysis of a potential “major question” 
however is that no court has ever explained where the line is drawn, in terms of economic and 
political significance, between so-called “major questions” and reasonable interpretation.  Yet if 
precedent is any guide, the CPP should not be considered a major question.  In Brown & 
Williamson, the Court decided that a ban on all tobacco products was sufficiently “major.”  In 
Burwell, the issue involved billions of dollars, and affected the health insurance policies of 
millions of Americans.188  Finally, in UARG, the Court invoked the doctrine to invalidate an 
interpretation that would have brought millions of new sources under the Title V permitting 
program, placing a huge administrative burden on both the EPA and businesses that are not 
typically considered sources of air pollution.189  The CPP is clearly distinguishable from each of 
these situations.  First, the rule predominantly impacts a small sector of the U.S. economy, the 
coal industry.  Unlike Burwell,  other than reducing air pollution, the CPP will not make a 
noticeable difference in the lives of the vast majority of Americans.190   Second, unlike Brown & 
                                                 
188 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
189 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). 
190 The EPA studied the possible consequences for energy availability, reliability, and price, and concluded that the 
CPP would not have a negative effect on consumers.  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64663. 
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Williamson, the regulation does not result in a total ban on any product or process; it simply 
incentivizes a reduction in coal power.  Third, building blocks 2 and 3 really only apply to fossil-
fuel fired power plants, a substantially smaller number of sources nationwide than was at issue in 
UARG.191  Finally, it is likely that the energy sector would have responded to the CPP by 
substituting natural gas and renewables for fossil fuel sources even if those measures had not 
been suggested in building blocks 2 and 3.  This is because the mandated reductions in fossil-
fuel-fired power are consistent with industry trends favoring increased reliance on natural gas 
and renewable energy,192 and because displacement of fossil fuels represents the most cost-
effective means of achieving reductions in CO2.  Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the CPP 
represents a major disruption of the energy sector, as many challengers suggest.   
Moreover, to the extent that CPP does meet the criteria for a “major question,” as the 
preceding analysis outlines, there is strong evidence that § 111(d) represents clear Congressional 
authorization for the offsite measures contemplated by the CPP.  This is because the history of 
the Act, the legislative record, past rulemakings, and even past instances of deference to the EPA 
all point to the fact that the CAA, and § 111 in particular, authorizes beyond the fenceline 
measures, at least to some degree.  In this regard, the situation is the complete opposite as that of 
Brown & Williamson, in which Congress had repeatedly acted under the assumption that the 
FDA could not regulate tobacco products. 
Challengers’ arguments also fail with regards to the issue of agency expertise.  The Court 
has repeatedly indicated that it views the EPA as an expert agency with regards to the CAA and 
                                                 
191 See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, at 2-7 available at 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf (indicating that there are only 
1257 coal-fired power plants in service nationwide). 
192 See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 137, at 39 (noting that coal-fired 
electricity fell from 50% to 39% of total energy production between 2004 and 2014, while over the same period the 
reliance on natural gas and renewables increased from 18% to 27% and 9% to 14%, respectively).  
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air pollution.193  Although opponents of the CPP argue that the EPA is overstepping it authority 
and deputizing itself as an energy regulator, they fail address the fact that Congress 
acknowledged the relationship between air pollution controls and the energy industry when it 
drafted other provisions of the CAA.  Thus, the argument that the major questions doctrine 
should be invoked to deny deference to the EPA because it lacks sufficient expertise to 
administer the CPP is unpersuasive.  
V. Conclusion 
No discussion of the imminent legal challenge to the CPP can afford to ignore the 
exigencies of the moment.  When the final rule was published, many thought that the rule’s fate 
would likely rest in the hands of Justice Kennedy, as the swing vote in a 5-4 decision.194  Perhaps 
no one expected that the Court would grant a stay, much less that Justice Scalia would pass away 
within weeks of that unprecedented decision.  At the time the stay was granted, headlines 
suggested that the CPP was in serious trouble,195 although no one could say exactly why; the 
Court’s stay order contained no reasoning, but simply indicated that the four “liberal” Justices 
had voted against it.  Now, following Scalia’s demise, there is a chance that the political 
obfuscation surrounding the nomination process will have the ironic effect of ensuring that the 
Court cannot strike the rule.196  Right now, litigation is proceeding on an expedited schedule, and 
                                                 
193 Chevron itself being an example of the Court’s willingness to defer to the EPA’s interpretations of the CAA.  See 
also American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 427 (2011) (identifying the EPA as an “expert 
agency” with regards to the administration of the CAA). 
194 See John Siciliano, Justice Kennedy Will Decide the EPA Climate Plan’s Fate, WASHINGTON EXAMINER (OCT. 
30, 2015, 7:50 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/justice-kennedy-will-decide-the-epa-climate-plans-
fate/article/2575374. 
195 See Coral Davenport, Supreme Court’s Blow to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris Climate Accord, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/carbon-emissions-paris-climate-accord.html. 
196 See Robin Bravender, Scalia’s Death ‘Puts All the Action’ in D.C. Circuit, E&E PUBLISHING (Feb. 19, 2016) 
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the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals will hear the case in early June.197  If Republicans prevent an 
Obama nominee from reaching the bench, there is a chance that the challenge will be decided by 
an evenly divided Supreme Court.  Thus, there is a possibility that the same Republican 
obstructionism that bore the rule may ensure that it survives. 
 As for the actual legal analysis of the case, this Comment has outlined two issues of first 
impression that constitute the bulk of challengers’ arguments against the rule.  As the preceding 
analysis suggests, the EPA can adduce persuasive arguments in its favor.  Accordingly, the CPP 
should not be precluded by the House version of § 111(d), regardless of whether a court decides 
to give effect to the Senate version.  In addition, § 111(d) should be interpreted to allow 
generation-shifting as well as other measures taken beyond the fenceline, as such measures are 
generally recognized by all three branches of government as viable, efficient means of reducing 
air pollution.  Finally, the CPP does not warrant invalidation under the major questions doctrine 
because it is not sufficiently disruptive in light of precedent, because it is consistent with 
Congress’ vision of the CAA, and because the EPA is the expert agency tasked with regulating 
air pollution pursuant to the Act.  For these reasons, a reviewing court, namely the D.C. Circuit 
Court, should uphold the rule.  
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